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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant correctly cites its burden on appeal to marshall 
all of the evidence supporting the verdict. Defendant fails to 
meet that burden. Following are facts which defendant failed to 
marshall, but which are of record and strongly support the jury 
verdict. 
On the evening of November 8, 1988, plaintiff, Michael H. 
Suhr, was driving a semi-truck in a northwesterly direction along 
Interstate 84 in Box Elder County approximately five miles 
northwest of Snowville, Utah. This is an interstate highway with 
limited access. All fences along said highway system are owned, 
installed and maintained by the defendant. (Jury Instruction 
No. 27). 
Just as nightfall was arriving plaintiff's truck hit an 800 
pound black steer standing in the plaintiff's traffic lane. The 
pavement at this location is black asphalt. Suhr's truck was 
damaged and he sustained personal injuries in the accident. 
The fences required to protect the interstate in that area 
are a "Type B" fence as mandated by both UDOT and federal 
requirements. (TR 290, 291). Plaintiff's Exhibit 9, which is 
included in the Addendum of this Brief, shows the design 
requirements for Type B fence. The requirements specify two 
inches of clearance between the ground and the bottom wire of the 
fence. The requirements also specify that the top wire of the 
fence shall be 52 inches above ground level. 
In close proximity to the accident site is an area where 
water erosion cut a channel beneath the freeway fence. Plaintiff 
referred to this location as the "washout". This washout had 
been eroding for approximately 20 years. (TR 137) UDOT had been 
dumping fill in the washout three, four or five times every year. 
(TR 138) UDOT stated its reason for dumping fill in the washout 
was so that animals could not get out beneath the fence. (TR 
223) 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Stephens investigated the 
accident and returned to the scene the next afternoon to check 
the fence. When asked whether the 800 pound steer could have 
entered the freeway at the location of the washout, Trooper 
Stephens indicated that a steer of that size could get its neck 
under the fence and might be able to push its way underneath. He 
claimed to have seen steers do this before due to the tremendous 
amount of lift which an 800 pound animal can apply. (TR 86) 
Trooper Stephens indicated the distance from the bottom of the 
washout to the lowest wire of the fence was approximately 18 to 
24 inches. (TR 93) 
Tom Wilcock was called and testified that he had over 30 
years experience handling cattle. He was the owner of the black 
steer which was hit. He testified that the day after the 
accident he inspected the fence in the area of the washout. 
The bottom of the fence would have been bent like 
you was going out. That spot, I believe, served as a 
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rub for the cattle to stick in their heads and rub 
their neck. (TR 335 19-22) 
Tom Wilcock testified that based upon the condition of the fence 
and his knowledge of cattle, the steer could have gone under the 
fence in the washout. (TR 336) 
Clinton Burt was qualified by plaintiff as a cattle expert. 
He testified that barbed wire would tend to discourage cattle 
from rubbing against it but field fencing does not have barbs to 
discourage a cow from pushing against it. (TR 358) When asked 
whether an 800 pound steer could get underneath a fence with a 
clearance of approximately 20 inches Mr. Burt responded: 
Oh yeah, if it's loose. If it's tight it can't 
make it, but if it's loose they'll just keep working 
until they get up on their shoulders and then go, 
especially if there's something they can reach for. 
(TR 359 L 8-11) 
When asked whether he had observed any tracks in the dirt in 
the area of the washout, Trooper Stephens stated: 
No. But there again, I didn't go down and do a 
total hands on. (TR 93) 
Records from the National Climatic Data Center show that at 
the time of the accident there had been no rainfall in Snowville 
during the month of November. They additionally show that the 
last previous rainfall in Snowville had been 25 days prior to the 
accident and that there had only been .07 hundredths of an inch 
of rainfall during the entire month of October, 1988 at 
Snowville. (Addendum Ex. #14) All witnesses agreed that without 
moisture, tracks would be very difficult to observe. (TR 159) 
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UHP Trooper Stephens testified that the lowest strand of 
fence above the washout was field fence, lacking any barbs, and 
actually quite smooth. He acknowledged it was not likely there 
would be any hair caught on the fence by a steer going under it. 
(TR 110f 111) 
A unique feature of this location of the interstate is a box 
culvert running beneath the traveled portions of the highway. 
The structure actually consists of two separate concrete tunnels, 
one beneath the lanes of traffic going each direction. Between 
these tunnels in the median there are concrete wing walls and two 
short sections of wire fence. This location is portrayed in 
Exhibits 3, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, which are attached to this 
Brief in the Addendum in numerical order. UDOT fence 
requirements for this location are standard Type B fence 
requiring two inches clearance from the ground to the bottom wire 
and 52 inches from the ground to the top wire. The photographs 
show that the fence in the median area is loose, sagging, and 
less than 36 inches in height. These photographs were taken 
three years after the accident but undisputed testimony 
established the condition of the fence on November 9, 1988 to be 
essentially the same as in the photos. (TR 328) 
When asked whether the 800 pound steer could have gone over 
the fence in the median section, Tom Wilcock replied: 
Yes. That median fence has always been suspect in 
my mind. If I had 300 of them, (cattle) 299 could find 
their way over it if they wanted. (TR 336 L 21-23) 
(parenthetical word added) 
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At the time of the accident the gate depicted in Exhibit No, 
24 was closed, so that the cattle on the north side of the 
freeway could wander into the culvert and fenced median area but 
could not continue on through to the south. (TR 154, 330) 
A steer entering the culvert from the north would arrive 
at open space in the median, where it would find itself boxed in. 
The only way out would be back through the tunnel to the north or 
over the sagging fence. Cattle expert Clinton Burt provided 
critical insight into the conditions in the median area of the 
culvert: 
Q. If a cow is frightened will it react quite 
suddenly? 
A. Usually yeah. We try to work them real 
careful for that reason. Not too much noise. 
Q. I want to give you the same hypothetical as 
far as the steer, about 18 months old, about 800 
pounds. If it were frightened could it jump over a 
fence where the top wire was about 36 inches? 
A. I imagine it could if there was no other place 
to go. It would have to be kind of boxed in. 
Q. If it were boxed in do you think it would do 
that? 
A. Yes. (TR 360 L 14-25, TR 361 L 1) 
After being shown various photographic exhibits, including 
those attached in the Addendum of this Brief, Burt was asked: 
Q. Now I'll represent to you and I think the 
photographs depict, that there are lanes of interstate 
highway on either side of this area. If an 18 month 
old steer were to walk down this culvert and that gate 
were closed, is it possible that while standing in this 
median area a semi or a horn might frighten the steer? 
A. Well, I'm sure it is. When we work cattle in 
the corral we box them in. By nature they111 find the 
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spot that is the least resistant and that is why 1 say 
boxed in. Sometimes it might even be me that's the 
least resistance. 
Q. Do they become much more nervous when they're 
boxed in? 
A. They're more nervous when boxed in. 
Q. When boxed in they are nervous? 
A. Yes. They9re looking for a way out, 
regardless, if they get spooked. They911 find the best 
place they think they can make it. (TR 361 L 23-25, TR 
362 L 1-14) 
On redirect Mr. Burt was asked: 
Q. Are there also likely places where a cow will 
get out? 
A. Well, it's like I said, they911 find the least 
resistance. 
Q. If you had a field and one portion of the 
fence was only 36 inches high would you consider that a 
likely spot that a cow would get out? 
A. According to those pictures I would think it9s 
a likely spot in the middle, because you know, they 
can9t get through that cement wall. If they9re boxed 
in there and are looking for daylight or wherever to 
get out sometimes it's even over the top of anybody 
else that's there if they're that spooked. (TR 364 L 
20-25, TR 365 L 1-7) 
On re-cross examination Mr. Burt was asked: 
Q. I guess you're assuming that the steer didn't 
have a way out this way or that way, right, when you 
say this is a likely spot? 
A. Well they could get out - I mean, it would be 
likely to me, yes, according to the pictures and I 
don't know when they were taken or how close, but that 
fence is real loose. It's real short and it's about 
impossible to make a short fence tight, that's the 
thing. 
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Both the washout and the sagging median fence are in close 
proximity to the accident location. (P. Ex. #1) UDOT employees 
and the Utah Highway Patrol Trooper checked the fence for a 
considerable distance in both directions from the accident site. 
They found no breaks or other problems. (TR 103 and TR 134, 135) 
The following page contains a sketch drawing of the interstate in 
the area of the accident. This drawing was not an Exhibit at 
trial but is a composite of numerous exhibits. It is intended to 
assist the reader in becoming oriented to the photographic 
exhibits which are included in the Addendum. 
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This is a Composite Drawing taken from Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 3, 5, 6, 21, 22, 24. It is intended to show 
the aeneral lavout and is not to scale. 
Defendant's Statement of Facts relies heavily on 
testimony from Rod Arbon, a UDOT employee. In quoting Arbon 
defendant fails to follow the acknowledged requirement of 
marshalling all evidence in support of the jury verdict. Much of 
Arbon's testimony as cited by defendant does not support the jury 
verdict. Rod Arbon was totally discredited in the eyes of the 
jury. Mr. Arbon was called as an adverse witness by the 
plaintiff and questioned about his investigation following the 
accident. He testified that he looked closely for tracks where 
the steer might have exited the pasture, but found none. He 
testified that he expected to see tracks because there had been a 
rain storm just a day or two earlier and the ground was soft and 
moist so that tracks would be more visible. He testified it is 
much more difficult to see tracks if the ground is dry and hard. 
(TR 159) He stated that this rain storm was "key" to him in his 
investigation. (TR 161) 
Following this testimony plaintiff produced the records from 
the National Climatic Data Center showing that there had been no 
rainfall for 25 days prior to the accident and that there had 
been only .07 hundredths of an inch moisture in the 39 days 
preceding the accident. (Ex. #14 in Addendum) 
At best, Mr. Arbon's testimony represents lousy 
recollection, at worst, fabrication. The records from the 
weather service were totally unrebutted. 
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Mr. Arbon was a poor witness, as evidenced by the critique 
offered by the trial judge in chambers, mercifully outside the 
hearing of the witness: 
THE COURT: I think his experience as a witness so 
far is he hasn't always responded the way the person 
asking him the questions would expect him to. (TR 174) 
THE COURT: I think he's very confused and I'm 
trying to help unconfuse him as to what is expected. 
(TR 184) 
THE COURT: I think it's very clear that this man 
is confused as to where he is looking at it and what 
he's supposed to be testifying about. Not necessarily 
what his answer is. I don't think he's known from the 
time he got on the witness stand what his answer was 
supposed to be. (TR 185) 
THE COURT: I'll certify him as an adverse witness 
but I don't think this jury perceives him as being anti 
or pro anybody at this point. Just confused. (TR 188) 
THE COURT: This guy is obviously just really 
confused. (TR 189) 
Instructions 18 and 20 advised the jurors that they could 
believe or disregard any witness in accordance with the 
credibility they determined the witness to deserve. After Mr. 
Arbon's imaginary rain storm and the court's withering assessment 
of him as a witness, it is incredible that defendant's Brief 
alleges Arbon's claims of having seen a steer jump a five foot 
fence or that Wilcock had cattle further down the freeway were 
"unrebutted". The jurors' verdict confirms that in their eyes 
Arbon was discredited. 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Suhr, there was an 
abundance of evidence adduced at trial from numerous witnesses 
supporting Suhr's theory that the steer had been in the pasture 
on the north side of the highway and that it escaped either 
beneath the fence at the washout or over the fence in the median 
area. The circumstances at the time of the accident were such 
that it would be highly unlikely to find direct evidence 
regarding how the steer entered the highway. The volume of 
circumstantial evidence is highly persuasive and was unanimously 
accepted by this jury. Because substantial competent evidence 
supports the jury's verdict, it should be affirmed as a matter of 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE AND PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
Federal and state requirements mandate Type B fence with a 
maximum clearance of two inches from ground level to the lowest 
wire and a minimum height of 52 inches from ground level to the 
top wire. Defendant's opening statement promised the jurors that 
the evidence would show the fence in the location of the accident 
met established standards. (TR 44, 51) Subsequently the 
evidence showed that the clearance beneath the fence at the 
washout was 18 to 24 inches and the height of the median fence 
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was sagging at less than 36 inches. The lowest wire in the area 
of the washout was field fence containing no barbs and, 
therefore, having nothing to prevent a steer from pushing against 
it. Not only was the median fence more than 16 inches too low, 
all experts agreed that a sagging fence would make it much easier 
for a steer to escape than would a tight fence of the same 
height. It is beyond dispute that the defendant was guilty of 
negligence in its maintenance of the fences. The evidence also 
strongly indicated negligence in the overall design of the 
fences, culvert and drainage. 
Trooper Stephens and UDOT employees checked all freeway 
fences within approximately one mile of the accident location and 
found no other points where the integrity of the fence was in 
question. 
Four witnesses with extensive experience with cattle 
testified concerning the conditions of the fence at the washout 
and median locations and provided their opinions as to whether 
the steer entered the freeway at one of those two locations. It 
is obvious from the trial court's statements and the jury's 
verdict that Rod Arbon was discredited. His testimony, having no 
value in the eyes of the jury, will not be reviewed here. 
Trooper Paul Stephens testified that the steer could have 
gotten far enough under the fence to force its way through at the 
washout. Trooper Stephens was not asked about the median fence 
and there is no indication he even inspected it. 
12 
The steer owner, Tom Wilcock, stated that the steer could 
have gone under the fence at the washout. When asked about the 
possibility of the steer going over the fence in the median 
section Wilcock stated that in his opinion 299 out of 300 steers 
could go over that section of fence if they wanted to. 
Rancher Clinton Burt testified that if there were 20 inches 
of clearance beneath the field fence, such as in the area of the 
washout, the steer could have gone under the fence. Burt 
testified that noises easily spook cattle and that cattle do not 
like to be boxed in. When asked whether a steer the age and size 
in question could jump a 36 inch fence if it were boxed in Burt 
very directly answered "yes". Burt repeatedly explained that 
cattle find the point of least resistance or the best place they 
think they can get out. He testified that the fence in the 
median section constituted a likely spot where the steer escaped 
and that to him, according to the photographic exhibits, it was 
likely the steer went over the median fence. 
Clinton Burt has been a cattle rancher his entire life. 
Defendant's Brief misrepresents two colloquialisms from Mr. 
Burt's testimony. When asked whether the specific steer could 
jump over a 36 inch fence Mr. Burt responded, "I imagine it 
could." (TR 360) In agricultural vernacular the word "imagine" 
is intended to convey belief or agreement, not hallucination. 
Mr. Burt also testified, "If they're boxed in there and are 
looking for daylight or wherever to get out, sometimes its even 
over the top of anybody else that is there if they're that 
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spooked." (TR 365) Mr. Burt clearly was conveying that an 800 
pound steer would knock a human being down and run over the top 
of the person. Defendants Brief at page 7 attempts to construe 
this statement as an indication the steer would leap high over 
the head of an individual and that this, therefore, corroborates 
Arbon's claims of a steer jumping a five foot fence. Defendant's 
misinterpretation of Burt's statement is as believable as the 
nursery rhyme where the cow jumped over the moon. 
A review of all evidence presented to the jury leaves one 
persuaded that direct evidence as to how the steer exited the 
pasture would be highly unlikely. There were no eye witnesses, 
the ground was rock hard, and the fence was not likely to grab 
any hair or hide. 
Direct evidence is not required for a verdict. 
Jurors may not speculate as to possibilities; they 
may, however, make justifiable inferences from 
circumstancial evidence to find negligence or proximate 
cause. In such instances, circumstantial evidence is 
sufficient to establish a prima facia case of 
negligence, if men of reasonable minds may conclude 
that there is a greater probability that the conduct 
relied upon was the proximate cause of the injury than 
there is that it was not. Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed. 
497 P2d 28, 31 (Ut. 1972). Also see Mason v. Arizona 
Public Service Commission, 622 P2d 493 (Az. App. 1980), 
Holmes v. Gamble, 624 P2d 905 (Colo. App. 1980), 
Jacques v. Montana National Guard. 649 P2d 1319 (Mont. 
1982) and Klossner v. San Juan County. 586 P2d 899 
(Wash. App. 1978) 
The circumstantial evidence in this case is compelling. It led 
eight reasonable jurors to unanimously conclude the steer got 
onto the interstate as a result of defendant's negligence. The 
jury's verdict should be affirmed. 
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POINT II. 
THE CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT ARE EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE. 
Defendant relies heavily on Rhiness v. Dansie. 472 P2d 428 
(Ut. 1970). The following factual summary from the Rhiness 
opinion is critical: 
. . • the defendant's land had a gate therein 
which was used by defendant and others. This gate was 
kept fastened by means of a chain with a snap on one 
end. 
On the night in question the gate was partially 
open at the time of the collision. The defendant had 
been at the property on the day in question and 
observed at the time he left that the gate was securely 
fastened. Rhiness. 429 (emphasis added) 
The court ruled there was no showing of negligence against 
the defendant. The court was obviously relying heavily on the 
fact that the gate was not under the exclusive control of this 
defendant and there was no evidence of this defendant having been 
negligent in his maintenance of the gate. Obviously an unknown 
third party had left the gate open following defendant's 
departure that day. 
In Vanderwater vs. Hatch. 835 F2d 239 (Tenth Circuit, 1987) 
the evidence showed no evidence of any defects in the pasture 
fence. There was a five mile stretch of open range beginning 
one-half to three-fourths of a mile west of the accident scene. 
Plaintiff presented no expert testimony regarding negligence. 
The court ruled that a res ipsa loquitor instruction was not 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
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Unlike Vanderwater. the present case involves (1) two 
glaring defects in the pasture fence, (2) no open rangef and (3) 
testimony from multiple experts regarding defendant's negligent 
conduct and the likelihood that this allowed the steer's presence 
on the freeway. 
In Mitchell vs. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P2d 240 (Ut. 1985) 
the victim was found murdered in his hotel room and the crime was 
never solved. The court noted: 
The fact that there was no evidence of forced 
entry into Mitchell's room could be probative of 
entrance by a person using an unauthorized master or 
room key. However, it could also be probative of 
entrance, at Mitchell's invitation, by a friend or 
collegue. Mitchell. 246. (emphasis added) 
The decision turns on the fact that the hotel room was not 
under the exclusive control of the hotel company. The victim may 
well have unknowingly or under duress invited the assailant into 
the victim's room. Such circumstances would not constitute 
negligence on the part of the hotel. 
In the present case there is no possibility that Suhr 
invited the steer onto the freeway. 
Defendant cites Staheli vs. Farmers Cooperative of Southern 
Utah. 655 P2d 680 (Ut. 1982) a case in which plaintiff filed suit 
seeking to recover for grain stored with defendant and destroyed 
by fire. In its recitation of facts the court noted: 
The portion of the cellar not leased to the 
(defendant) was retained and used by the owner for its 
purposes. There was no wall or partition between that 
part of the pit leased to the (defendant) and that part 
retained by (owner) for its own use. The farmers whose 
grain was stored in (owner's) potato cellar knew that 
the (defendant) was using that facility for their grain 
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because they had hauled their grain into and out of the 
potato pit. . . 681. 
The (plaintiff) as well as agents of the 
(defendant) had unlimited access to the pit through 
both the end leased to the (defendant) and the end 
retained by the owner; there were transients who were 
observed in or around the potato pit on October 6, 1976 
The court's opinion begins by recognizing the general rule 
of law that where goods baled for a fee are damaged, a 
presumption of negligence is imposed on the bailee. Two excerpts 
from the court's opinion are particularly relevant for the 
present considerations. 
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is that 
the bailee be in exclusive possession, and it is that 
proposition that gives logical force to the 
presumption. . . 
This court has observed that the evidentiary rules 
governing balement are in some respects similar to 
those governing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, 
although there are important procedural 
differences . . . Exclusive control of or 
responsibility for the instrumentality causing the 
injury is necessary to give rise to an inference of 
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. 
Staheli 683 (emphasis added) 
Rhiness, Mitchell, and Staheli are concerned respectively 
with a gate, a hotel room, and a storage bin. The appellate 
court in Rhiness found the gate was not under the exclusive 
control of defendant, in Mitchell the hotel room was not under 
the exclusive control of defendant, in Staheli the storage bin 
was not under the exclusive control of defendant. These cases 
are all distinguishable from the present case. This fence was 
under the exclusive control of this defendant. There is no 
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conceivable theory whereby a third party suddenly caused the 
washout or the problems with the median fence. These cases give 
no support to defendant's position. 
POINT III. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
This trial lasted four long days. The jury deliberated four 
and three-quarters hours. Jury instructions 24, 25, 26, 32 and 
33 all addressed the issue of causation, and are included in this 
Brief in the Addendum. 
In denying the defendant's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict the trial judge offered valuable 
insights into the evidence and this jury; 
The real question that the court has is there 
sufficient evidence that was placed before the jury to 
satisfy them by a preponderance of the evidence that 
there was in fact negligence, that there was in fact 
causation and there was in fact damages? I polled the 
jury and I think - let me say this for the record, I 
think that there were sufficient instructions on 
causation because the jury needed to understand what 
the court was expecting them to find before they could 
find liability. They've been referred to by 
plaintiff's counsel and the court has looked at them 
again and I'm satisfied that in fact they did that. I 
don't know if there's an objection on file to those 
instructions somewhere or not, but that can be raised 
in another forum for someone else. 
In my judgment, on causation, the jury understood 
that there had to be a relationship of causation and 
negligence on the part of the state. In this case it 
related to the fencing and the maintenance of the 
fence. 
I also am of the opinion that the court must 
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
verdict. I agree with the interpretation and with the 
citation that plaintiff has given me. I think that's 
the law. It doesn't mean that I would have given the 
same verdict or that I even agree with the verdict. It 
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is just that there is sufficient evidence to show - to 
satisfy a jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, as 
to causation. That's really the question. 
There was evidence back and forth on both sides 
and there was no actual testimony as to where the steer 
actually got out for sure, but there was testimony that 
it could have walked over one place and crawled over 
another place. The court notes that the jury was 
troubled by that and they felt that perhaps that was 
causation, the fact that the steer was hit in the 
immediate location of those two areas of the fence, 
very close to those two areas of the fence. 
I don't recall that every being argued, really 
directly, but I think that the facts are consistent 
with the fact that the steer was hit very close to the 
defects in the fence, which adds, again, more weight to 
the fact that the steer, by a preponderance, got over 
the negligent portion of the fence, which relates then 
to the causation question. (January 8, 1992 Transcript 
of Findings and Ruling pages 2, 3, and 4) 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the standards to 
be applied when reviewing a jury verdict. 
. . . we defer to the jury and evaluate the 
evidence in a light favorable to the verdict. We 
accept the evidentiary inferences that tend to support 
the verdict rather than contrary inferences that 
support the appellant's version of the facts, even if 
we might have judged those inferences differently had 
we been deciding the matter in the first instance, and 
not as an appellate court . . . When the testimony of 
witnesses is in conflict, we accept that testimony 
which supports the jury's verdict, unless it is 
inheritantly implausible, and ignore the evidence which 
does not support the verdict, even if we might think it 
more convincing . . . for the appellants to overturn 
the jury verdict, therefore, they must set out in their 
briefs, with record references, all the evidence that 
supports the verdict, including all valid inferences to 
that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people 
would not conclude that the evidence supports the 
verdict. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P2d 151, 
156 (Utah 1991) 
. . . We exercise "every reasonable presumption in 
favor of the validity of a general verdict." To give 
effect to that presumption we look to pleadings, 
evidence, instructions, verdict forms and the manner in 
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which the case was tried to determine whether possible 
error in the verdict is reversible. . . General 
verdicts are to be construed with a view to sustaining 
the verdict and effectuating the intention of the iurv 
if possible. Where that intention is not clearly 
apparent from the verdict itself inferences may be 
drawn from the evidence, the pleadings, the jury 
instructions and other relevant portions of the record. 
Hodges 164 (emphasis added) 
In the present case there is no need to speculate as to how 
the jury viewed the issue of proximate cause. Page 2 of the 
Special Verdict Form, question number 2, appears as follows: 
If defendant State of Utah was negligent as alleged, 
did such negligence proximately cause the plaintiff, 
Michael H. Suhr, to sustain injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes 
In King v. Feredav the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A trial court should grant a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict if, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, 
it finds that no competent evidence supports the 
verdict. In reviewing the trial court's determination 
on such an issue, this court must apply the same 
standard. King v. Fereday. 739 P2d 618, 620 (Ut. 1987) 
Issues of negligence and issues of proximate cause are 
usually factual issues and in most circumstances are not resolved 
as a matter of law. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P2d 
614 (Ut. 1985) and Unigard Insurance Company v. Citv of LaVerkin, 
689 P2d 1344 (Ut. 1984) 
In conclusion plaintiff refers the court to State v. 
Webster, 504 P2d 1316 (Nev. 1972) That case involved seven dark 
colored horses which had escaped from a pasture located near an 
unguarded entrance to a newly constructed controlled-access 
freeway on the evening of December 14, 1967. The facts indicate 
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that the accident occurred at around 11:00 p.m. on a "dark, 
moonless night". The trial court determined the state was 
negligent in failing to install a cattle guard at the freeway 
entrance and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the accident. A review of the opinion makes clear that no 
eyewitnesses observed the horses enter the interstate at this 
location. Rather, through a process of deduction, it was 
determined that this was the only location where the horses could 
have entered. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
The jury in the present case consisted of eight reasonable 
people who were accepted by the defendant. They participated 
patiently and attentively throughout four days of trial. They 
received numerous instructions concerning the law with regards to 
causation. They deliberated almost five hours. They returned a 
special verdict which specifically found the negligence of the 
defendant to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The 
jury was subsequently interviewed by the trial court and the 
judge found that the jury read and understood the instructions 
and in the court's opinion had properly applied them to the 
evidence. 
The defendant's Brief does not come close to meeting the 
standard identified for reversal of a jury verdict. On the 
contrary, there is substantial evidence to support the jury's 
verdict and it should be affirmed as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
There was an abundance of circumstantial evidence of causal 
connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's 
injuries. The cases relied upon by defendant are easily 
distinguishable in that the fence in this case was under the 
exclusive control of the defendant. The jury's verdict should be 
affirmed as a matter of law. 
DATED this day of July, 1992. 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Debra J. Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
tr/11:suhr.brf 
22 
ADDENDUM 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 - Median Fence 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 - Fence Specifications 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 - Weather Records 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 - Median Area 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 - Median Fence with Yard Stick 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 - Tom Wilcock at Median Fence 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 - Box Tunnels with Closed Gate 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 - Close Up Median Fence with Yard Stick 
Jury Instruction No. 20 - Credibility of Witnesses 
Jury Instruction No. 24 - Proximate Cause 
Jury Instruction No. 25 - Proximate Cause 
Jury Instruction No. 26 - Negligence - Proximate Cause 
Jury Instruction No. 32 - Definitions, Negligence - Proximate 
Cause 
Jury Instruction No. 33 - Mere Fact that Animal Escaped Not 
Sufficient 
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Asheville, N.C. 
I CERTIFY that the attached are authentic and true copies of 
meteorological records on file in the NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER, 
ASHEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA. 
/*&/C RICHARD M. DAVIS 
RECORDS CUSTODIAN 
DATA ADMINISTRATOR 
(Official Title) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT RICHARD M. DAVIS RECORDS CUSTODIAN, who 
led the foregoing certificate, is now, and was at the time of 
ling, DATA ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER, and that 
faith and credit should be given his certificate as such. I 
\iher state that I am the person to whom the said custodian reports. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto 
subscribed my name and caused the seal 
of the Department of Commerce to be 
affixed on this date: DEC 0 3 1991 
For the SECRETARY OF COMMERCE: 
\ < ^ - _ KENNETH D. HADEEN 
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER 
(Certifying Officer) 
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INSTRUCTION NO, ffl) 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as 
to any material matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of 
the witness, except as that witness may have been corroborated by 
other credible evidence. 
0226c 
JURY INSTRUCTION r*t 
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural 
and continuous sequence, produces the injury and without which the 
injury would not have occurred. A proximate cause is one which sets 
in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
0236c 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In addition to deciding whether the defendant was negligent, 
you must decide if that negligence was a "proximate cause" of the 
plaintiff's injuries. 
To find "proximate cause"/ you must first find a cause and 
effect relationship between the negligence and plaintiff*s injury. 
But cause and effect alone is not enough. For injuries to be 
proximately caused by negligence, two other factors must be present: 
First/ the negligence must have played a substantial role in 
causing the injuries; and 
Second, a reasonable person could foresee that the injury 
could result from the negligent behavior. 
0235c 
INSTRUCTION NO. &[p 
In this case the plaintiff claims that the defendant State of 
Utah was negligent in the following respects: 
1. Negligence in maintaining a fence; 
2. Improper design of drainage areas. 
Defendant State of Utah claims that if anybody was negligent 
and at fault for the steer getting on the highway, it was the 
landowner or operator. 
To return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence thatvi I 4 * 0* *rt r\ * » 
1. Onn nr^ iulili uf MIL dafuMewiLj we»e negligent in one or 
more of the particulars alleged; and 
2. Such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. 
If you find in favor of the plaintiff on those two questions, 
you must then decide the amount of the damages suffered by the 
plaintiff. 
0229c 
INSTRUCTION NO. /3£ 
The terms "negligence", "contributory negligence", "ordinary 
care", and "proximate cause", as used in these instructions, are 
defined as follows: 
A. "Negligence" means the failure to do what a reasonable 
and prudent person would have done under the circumstances 
involved, or doing what a reasonable and prudent person would not 
have done under such circumstances. The faulty conduct may lie 
either in acting or in not acting.* The standard of conduct 
required in any given case is dictated and measured by the 
immediate requirements of the occasion as determined from the 
existing facts and circumstances. You will note that the person 
whose conduct we set up as a standard is not the extraordinary 
cautious individual, not the exceptionally skillful one, but a 
person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. While exceptional 
caution and skill are to be admired and encouraged, the law does 
not demand them as a general standard of conduct; 
B. "Contributory Negligence" is negligence on the part of 
the person injured which, alone or together with the negligence 
of the other party, contributes in proximately causing such 
person's own injury; 
C. "Ordinary Care" is that degree of care which a 
reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar 
circumstances. "Ordinary Care" implies that exercise of 
reasonable diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight 
as under all the circumstances of the particular case would be 
exercised by a reasonably careful, prudent person; 
D. A "proximate cause" of an injury is a cause which in 
direct unbroken sequence produces the injury. It is one without 
which the injury would not have occurred. 
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proximate 
cause of an injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, or 
the conduct of only one person. To the contrary, the acts and 
omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the 
efficient cause of an injury, and in such a case, each of the 
participating acts or omissions is regarded by the law as a 
proximate cause and all may be responsible. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the plaintiff to recover in this action he must 
show, among other things, that the steer got upon the highway 
through the negligence of the defendant. "The mere fact that the 
animal escaped from the enclosure is not sufficient evidence, 
standing alone, to justify" recovery based on negligence! 
0239c 
